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INTRODUCTION
The subject of character-related evidence has haunted the law for centu-
ries. Aptly described by the Supreme Court in a leading case as a "gro-
tesque structure,"1 its Byzantine subtleties have long bedeviled courts,
eluded lawyers, and mystified law students.
This archaic system of rules has its origin in the common law. Some-
what surprisingly, recent statutory efforts to modernize the law of evidence
did little to simplify or clarify their operation. The Wisconsin Rules of Evi-
dence, based upon the Federal Rules of Evidence, accomplished little more
than a restatement of the common law edifice. Although they jettisoned
some of the more anachronistic features, these modem revisions incorpo-
rated the bulk of the complex mechanisms of the common law. Moreover,
1. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 486 (1948).
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these efforts created additional problems because the rules did not embrace
the entire structure of the common law scheme. Some of the most intracta-
ble features and difficult problems of character evidence were entirely ig-
nored, thus creating even more flux and uncertainty.2
Since their enactment in 1974, the trial bar and the courts have strug-
gled with the implementation of the Wisconsin Rules of Evidence. The
rules on their face are unclear and sometimes inconsistent. They are a chal-
lenge to apply correctly, even in the comfort of a library. Within the dy-
namic of trial, the effort is often futile.
The difficulties created by this situation have a multiplier effect on the
law of evidence. When parties struggle to apply a decidedly imperfect body
of law, the result is usually a convoluted and incomplete trial court record.
It is from this record that the appellate court must conduct its evidentiary
autopsy to determine whether the rules were accorded appropriate fealty.
Since the trial record may simply mirror the confusion of the parties at
trial, the appellate court's task of then applying an imperfect set of rules to
a jumbled trial court record may result in an opinion which further exacer-
bates this situation.
The purpose of this article is to explore the subject of character-related
evidence in civil litigation. It will survey the applicable rules and the Wis-
consin cases interpreting the Wisconsin Rules of Evidence.
The decision to focus on civil applications is based on several factors.
First, courts and scholarly commentaries have centered on the criminal ap-
plication. Despite the rivers of ink spilled on the use of character-related
evidence rules in criminal litigation, abuses and confusion still
predominate.3 The relative dearth of authority in the civil context may
make it easier to put this house in order. Second, it appears that one reason
for the inattention to character-related evidence in civil cases may arise
from a failure to recognize the implications of these rules in the civil con-
text. The civil cases evince a tendency to submerge character concerns into
doctrines relating to "habit," "routine practice," and the admissibility of
"similar accidents." 4
A subsidiary goal of this article, then, will be to bring these implications
to light and attempt to rationalize the admissibility of at least some of this
evidence within the framework of the rules. In attempting this task, it is
2. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 5-13.
3. See, e.g., Weissenberger, Making Sense of Extrinsic Act Evidence: Federal Rule of Evidence
404(b), 70 IOWA L. REV. 579, 580 (1985).
4. Reed, The Pushy Ox: Character Evidence in Pennsylvania Civil Actions, 58 TEMP. L.Q.
623, 623 (1985).
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recognized, as Judge Learned Hand suggested, that the "system may work
best when explained least."'
The term "character-related evidence," as used in this article, embraces
not only the various uses (permissible and impermissible) of character evi-
dence, but also concepts which are closely associated, such as evidence of
other accidents or injuries, habits, and routine practices. The first subject
discussed is the meaning of "character" in the law of evidence. After ex-
ploring the confusion and vagaries surrounding this elemental concept, the
focus will shift to the uses to which character may be put in civil trials.
This includes the possible uses of character:
1. to show the trustworthiness of a witness;
2. as circumstantial evidence that the subject acted in conformity with
the character trait;
3. as relevant to some proposition other than the inference from char-
acter to conduct in conformity; or
4. where character itself is an element of the claim or the defense.
The next section will discuss the use of evidence of other acts, wrongs, or
accidents to prove (ostensibly) something other than the subject's character.
In particular, the emphasis will be on the admissibility of evidence of "simi-
lar acts." Finally, there is an examination of the interplay between the con-
cept of character and those concepts relating to "habit" and "routine
practice."
I. THE MEANING OF CHARACTER IN THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
Courts, commentators, and legislatures have neither defined the concept
of "character" with any precision nor furnished a list of recognized traits.6
The law of evidence uses "character" to broadly refer to a person's disposi-
tion or generalized propensity to behave in a certain manner.7 Modem evi-
5. Michelson, 335 U.S. at 481 n.18.
6. See R. ALLEN & R. KUHNS, AN ANALYTIC APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 230-32 (1989).
7. See C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 195, at 574 (3d ed. 1984); see also Kuhns, The Propen-
sity to Misunderstand the Character of Specific Acts Evidence, 66 IowA L. REV. 777, 779 (1981).
The American Law Institute's Model Code of Evidence defined "character" as follows:
"Character as used in these Rules means the aggregate of a person's traits, including those relating
to care and skill and their opposites." AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE
Rule 304 (1942).
Professor Uviller offered the following observations about the meaning of character:
In the simplified lexicon of evidence law, "character" may be understood to be a collec-
tion of "traits," each a self-contained packet of potential conduct consistent with previ-
ously observed reactions to events, people, or things. These behavioral fragments are
organized according to our English vocabulary; the items of behavior composing each trait
cluster about a common descriptive term such as "forgetful," "aggressive," or "honest."
1989]
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dentiary codes have made no concerted attempt to further refine this murky
definition. Character, then, is not formally identified in the law of evidence
with any particular school of scientific or psychological thought.' It repre-
sents more the ruminations of fireside psychology than it does the product
of the "mind sciences." 9
Despite the lack of a rigorous definition, the case law is peppered with
examples of character "traits." Courts have imbued human beings with
traits of "lawfulness," "peacefulness," "violence," "trustworthiness, .... hon-
esty," and "goodness.""I Left undiscussed is the nature and psychological
source of these traits, or any insight into how or why these traits affect
human behavior. It appears that these traits are simply a given; that is, the
existence of "character" is one of the underlying epistemological assump-
tions of the law of evidence. 1 Regardless of what the mind sciences have
By our careless usage, many of these linguistic boxes have lost their integrity. A term
thought to describe a discrete and persistent element of personality, such as "law-abiding"
or "cautious," may arise from a wide range of behavioral events or attitudes, and affords
only the crudest index for the prediction of a given act consistent with it. The semantic
problem of precision and narrowness in the categorization of character traits may be an
important feature in the reluctance of the law of evidence to appreciate the value of charac-
ter evidence; as such it deserves further attention ...."
Uviller, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct: Illusion, Illogic, and Injustice in the Courtroom,
130 U. PA. L. REv. 845, 849 (1982).
8. Its closest counterpart in modem psychology is the school of "trait" psychology. The field
of psychology is thoroughly splintered into different "schools" each offering vastly different expla-
nations for, and conceptions of, human behavior, perception and memory. See R. GATCHEL & F.
MEARS, PERSONALITY: THEORY, ASSESSMENT AND RESEARCH 159 (1982) (discussing the vari-
ous schools of trait psychology).
Recently, psychologists have attempted to assess the impact of "character" evidence on jury
decision making. See Borgida, Character Proof and Fireside Induction, 3 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
189 (1979).
9. When looking for insight into the meaning of character, one should begin with literature
from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries before perusing the pages of modem psychology
texts. The history of "character" in the law of evidence has yet to be traced adequately and is
certainly worthy of additional research. It appears that character played an increasingly impor-
tant role in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, particularly in the business sector and in
academic institutions. See P. HALL, THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN CULTURE, 1700-1900:
PRIvATE INSTITUTIONS, ELITES, AND THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN NATIONALITY 90 (1984) (dis-
cussing the significance of "character" and "character training" in the development of large-scale
business organizations in the 19th century: "Character by the 1820s had come to mean those
aspects of personality that rendered an individual dependable and predictable, disciplined and
internally controlled.").
10. See generally C. MCCORMICK, supra note 7, ch. 17.
11. See W. TWINING, THEORIES OF EVIDENCE: BENTHAM & WIGMORE 12-18 (1985). One
can speculate that perhaps part of the reason underlying the skepticism displayed by courts to-
ward the mind sciences of late arises from a clash of epistemological paradigms. See, e.g., Gold,
Psychological Manipulation in the Courtroom, 66 NEB. L. REV. 562 (1987). In short, the "psy-
chology" which underlies the law of evidence may not always coincide with modern psychological
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revealed, the law assumes that human beings possess character traits.1
Moreover, there is an unverified assumption that people act, at least some-
times, in accordance with these character traits.
research. This is explicable, in part, by the myriad of different schools of psychology. Faced with
these conflicts, the courts sometimes react by ignoring the psychological studies and relying on
"common-sense." See Camper & Loft[u]s, The Role of Psychologists as Expert Witnesses in the
Courtroom: No More Daniels in the Lion's Den, 9 LAw & PSYCHOLOGY REv. 1 (1985); McCord,
Syndromes, Profiles and Other Mental Exotica: A New Approach to the Admissibility of Nontradi-
tional Psychological Evidence in Criminal Cases, 66 OR. L. REv. 19, 21-27 (1987). This election
may seem rather luddite in nature, but it may be reasonable given the lack of consensus on human
thought and behavior in the field of psychology. See R. GATCHEL & F. MEARS, supra note 8.
This writer's tentative research suggests that "character" should be considered an axiom of the
law of evidence regardless of its status in modem psychology. In this sense, the concept of "char-
acter" is a cultural and social phenomenon describing our proclivity as human beings to attach
various labels to other individuals. It is a fact of everyday life that we generalize about other
people and commonly solicit the "opinions" of those we respect regarding what they think of
certain people. This is simply a very efficient way of processing information and making decisions.
Regardless of whether human beings actually have "general dispositions" and conform their be-
havior to these dispositions with any regularity, the important thing is that our culture assumes
this to be true. We seek out this information and act on it. Our confidence in its accuracy and
reliability is often dependent upon our own opinion of the source. In short, "character" may very
well be no more than the sum and substance of what other people think of us. Under this view,
any distinction between the methods of proving character (reputation and opinion) and the char-
acter trait itself is illusory. See M. SAKS & R. HASTiE, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY IN COURT 161-62
(1978).
To some degree this view may be seen in the development of the different modes of proving
character. At common law, character could be proven solely through "reputation," which
amounted to community gossip or opinion about the subject. Modem evidence codes recognize
the validity of "proving" character through personal opinion as well, primarily because reputation
is often no more than an ill-disguised personal opinion by the witness anyway.
Viewed in this light, the law's hostility toward the use of character evidence as a basis to infer
conduct in conformity is well placed. Although character provides a quick and efficient means of
measuring people in a social setting, it is resorted to primarily in the absence of other information
on which to make a decision. Its suitability in social, business, or political settings does not mean
that it is an appropriate basis on which to make a decision at a trial. Generalizations about
character are helpful when deciding important matters such as whether to hire a given individual.
Job references, for example, serve much the same function as character evidence. But our trial
system deems it unacceptable to predicate findings of civil or criminal liability for an event on this
kind of information alone. Moreover, the law of evidence has developed in such a way as to
strictly curb even the limited use of this evidence. What may be acceptable and necessary in every
day life may not be desirable in the courtroom, where other standards of rationality are thought to
hold sway.
12. There are two inferences bound up in the use of "character evidence" as circumstantial
evidence of conduct: (1) the inference from opinion, reputation or other act to "character," and
(2) the inference from character to conduct in conformity. The first inference is particularly tenu-
ous where specific instances form the only basis for the character trait. But difficulties with this
first inference are usually overshadowed by the weakness of the second, which often provides an
easier basis for excluding the evidence. Courts do not have to grapple with the difficult question of
whether there is sufficient evidence that an individual possesses some character trait if the second
inference (from character to conduct in conformity) is proscribed by the law, which is generally
the situation. See infra notes 3745 and accompanying text.
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The absence of a workable definition of "character" has important col-
lateral effects on the law of evidence. In criminal cases, the trial court may
admit only evidence of "pertinent" character traits as circumstantial evi-
dence of conduct. 13 Without a definition of "character," however, it is un-
clear what basis courts use to distinguish between the various "character"
traits to arrive at the pertinent ones.
More importantly, in civil and criminal cases, evidence of "other acts,
wrongs or crimes" may be admitted if relevant to show something other
than conduct by the actor in conformity with a character trait. For exam-
ple, a person's prior acts are often introduced to show that the person was
aware of something related to the acts and not for any aspersions the evi-
dence may cast on the individual's character. 4 But the vagaries surround-
ing the concept of character make it exceedingly difficult to rationally
separate the permissible uses of the evidence from the impermissible use of
the evidence to show a propensity to behave in a certain way.
In civil litigation the absence of a clear conception of character creates
still other problems. The amorphous nature of character makes it difficult
to distinguish from related constructs, such as habit or routine practice.
Since habit evidence is admissible to prove conduct in a civil case, the ban
against the use of character to prove conduct is often skirted by parading
character evidence in the guise of habit evidence. 5
In summary, "character" is an ill-defined and vague term. It may de-
scribe little more than our tendency as human beings to generalize about
other people. We label others as "sloppy," "dishonest, .... diligent," and
"good." We recognize, however, that such generalizations are often unfair
and poor indicators of what the person will do or has done on a given occa-
sion. The extremely low probative value of this evidence, combined with its
tendency to inject extraneous collateral matters, justifies the limited play it
is given at trial.
13. Wis. STAT. § 904.04(1) (1987-88). Only the defendant may introduce proof of his own
pertinent character trait for purposes of proving conduct in conformity with that trait. The prose-
cution is then free to rebut the character evidence initiated by the defendant but only where the
defendant initiated the proof of character. The same is true with respect to the character of a
victim, except in homicide cases where the prosecution may introduce evidence of the victim's
"peaceful" disposition to rebut evidence that the victim was the first aggressor. The mode of
proof is controlled by Section 904.05.
14. See Comment, Wisconsin's Uncharged Misconduct Evidence Rule: An Analysis of Section
904.04(2), 73 MARQ. L. REv. 319 (1990).
15. See infra text accompanying notes 87-93.
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II. CHARACTER EVIDENCE IN CIVIL LITIGATION
Character evidence may be admissible in civil cases depending upon the
proposition it is used to prove. There are four potential uses of character
evidence in a civil trial. They relate to: (1) the character of a witness for
truthfulness; (2) the circumstantial use of character to prove conduct;16 (3)
the circumstantial use of character to -prove something other than conduct;
and (4) proof of character where character is "at issue."
A. A Witness' Character for Truthfulness
Wisconsin evidence law permits the impeachment of a witness' charac-
ter for truthfulness through different forms of evidence. Section 906.08 of
the Wisconsin Statutes governs the use of reputation and opinion testimony
as well as the use of specific instances of conduct which bear on the witness'
character for truthfulness. The admissibility of prior criminal convictions
offered to impeach is governed by Section 906.09. Each of these forms of
evidence will be discussed in turn.
1. Reputation, Opinion, and Specific Instances
Proof of character may be offered if relevant to the credibility of a wit-
ness. This subject is controlled by several provisions of the Wisconsin
Rules of Evidence which apply in civil and criminal cases alike.
Section 906.08 allows the use of reputation or opinion testimony for the
purpose of attacking or supporting the credibility of a witness. This in-
volves the use of character witnesses; that is, witnesses who testify about the
truthfulness of other witnesses.17 A character witness will either offer a
16. The character of a witness for truthfulness is a subset of the circumstantial use of charac-
ter to prove conduct. It is discussed separately because the common law courts and modem
evidence codes developed special rules which apply only to character for truthfulness and have
accorded it wider admissibility in trials. See infra notes 17-36 and accompanying text.
17. Typically, the character witness is called to testify about the credibility of another witness
(the subject), although a witness could in theory testify about his own reputation. The foundation
for such testimony is fairly perfunctory, but occasionally courts and trial lawyers confuse reputa-
tion with opinion and create unnecessary problems. See, eg., State v. Cuyler, 110 Wis. 2d 133,
139, 327 N.W.2d 662, 665 (1983) (trial court and attorneys confused reputation with opinion
testimony, erroneously believing that only the former was admissible).
The foundation for testimony about the reputation of another witness for truthfulness requires
a showing that the witness is familiar with the subject in some social setting (home or workplace),
that other people have "discussed" the subject's pertinent trait, and that the witness overheard
their discussion. See Ladd, Techniques and Theory of Character Testimony, 24 IOvA L. Rnv.
498, 513-18 (1939).
The foundation for opinion testimony about the truthfulness of the subject witness requires a
showing that the character witness knows the subject personally and well enough to express a
personal opinion about the subject's truthfulness. Since specific instances of conduct may only be
1989]
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personal opinion about the subject witness' character for truthfulness or
testify about the subject's reputation in the community for truthfulness.'1
More problematic is the use of specific instances of conduct to prove the
witness' "untruthful" character. Section 906.08 limits inquiries about spe-
cific instances to cross-examination. Extrinsic evidence is not permitted to
impeach the witness' testimony. 19 In short, the cross-examiner must take
the witness' answer.20
Moreover, the specific instances of conduct must be relevant to a char-
acter trait for truthfulness. This character trait may be that ascribed to the
witness testifying, or to the subject witness whose character for truthfulness
is at issue.2' At common law, a witness' credibility could be impeached
with any bad act by the witness, even if the bad act had no direct bearing on
inquired into on cross-examination, they may not be used on direct examination under the guise of
qualifying the personal opinion. See FED. R. EVID. 405, Advisory Committee's Note.
18. Section 906.08 of the Wisconsin Statutes is worded in terms of character for "truthful-
ness." The term should not, however, be accorded talismanic significance. Questions about the
subject's "honesty" or "believability" are closely related and virtually indistinguishable. The
same is not true of inquiries about "goodness" or "lawabidedness," which carry different connota-
tions. The point is that the testimony should bear on the subject's capacity and propensity to tell
the truth.
19. "Extrinsic evidence" is undefined in the Wisconsin Rules of Evidence. It refers simply to
testimony by a witness other than the one being cross-examined, or to the introduction of docu-
ments. In short, it refers to evidence other than that gleaned from the cross-examination of the
witness. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 33, at 73:
The process of impeachment may be employed in two different stages. First, the facts
discrediting the witness or his testimony may be elicited from the witness himself upon
cross-examination. Certain kinds of attack are limited to this stage; it is said, "You must
take his answer." Second, in some situations, the facts discrediting the witness are proved
by extrinsic evidence, that is, the assailant waits until the time for putting on his own case
in rebuttal, and then proves by a second witness or by documentary evidence, the facts
discrediting the testimony of the witness attacked.
Id. (citations omitted).
Extrinsic evidence is barred by Section 906.08 only where it is offered as bearing on the wit-
ness' character for truthfulness. It may be received where other modes of impeachment are used.
For instance, Section 906.13 contemplates the use of extrinsic evidence to prove that the witness
has made a prior inconsistent statement. Extrinsic evidence may always be used to show a wit-
ness' bias. See McClelland v. State, 84 Wis. 2d 145, 155, 267 N.W.2d 843, 848 (1978).
20. Although the cross-examiner must ultimately take the answer and may not resort to ex-
trinsic evidence to impeach, this does not mean that the witness can be asked only once about the
incident. The trial court has the discretion to allow the cross-examiner to press the witness in an
attempt to get the witness to back down from the initial denial, or to paint the denial itself as
incredible or suspect. Wis. STAT. § 906.11; see 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S
EVIDENCE 608[05], at 608-30 (1988).
21. For instance, assume Witness A testifies that in her opinion Witness B is a trustworthy
person. On cross-examination Witness A may be asked about specific incidents in her own life
which are pertinent to her character for truthfulness. She may also be questioned about specific
incidents of Witness B's conduct which are relevant to Witness B's character for truthfulness.
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honesty.2 2 Section 906.08 requires, however, that the act be "probative" of
truthfulness, meaning that it must have some bearing on a propensity to tell
the truth. Particular instances of lying, cheating, or other acts of dishon-
esty are within the orbit of the rule.23
The requirement that the cross-examiner must take the answer, and
thus cannot offer extrinsic evidence of the specific act, creates a peculiar
situation. Where the witness denies the occurrence of the particular event,
the question alone insinuates the matter to the jury. The trier of fact might
well speculate that some truth lurks behind the question, regardless of the
witness' negative response or instructions to the effect that statements of
counsel are not evidence. To prevent abuses, it is suggested that trial courts
require a showing, outside the presence of the jury, that a good faith basis
exists to inquire regarding the specific instance.24 This procedure will pre-
clude baseless forays attempting to accomplish little more than to either
"get lucky" or unfairly sully the witness before the jury.
2. Impeachment by Prior Criminal Conviction
A witness' character for truthfulness can also be attacked through proof
of prior convictions pursuant to Section 906.09. Although this form of im-
peachment exists in all jurisdictions, Wisconsin's approach is so unique that
Wigmore dubbed it a "queer rule."25 In essence it is a "counting rule" by
which the jury is informed only of the fact that the witness has been con-
victed of a crime and the number of prior convictions. No further informa-
tion concerning the criminal record or the nature of the crimes is imparted
to the jury, except where the witness is evasive about either the existence or
number of convictions.
The procedure followed in Wisconsin works as follows: A party in-
tending to impeach a witness with evidence of prior criminal convictions
must first bring the matter to the court's attention outside the presence of
the jury. The trial court must then hold a hearing to determine the exist-
ence and extent of the criminal record and the admissibility of any convic-
tions for impeachment under Section 906.09.26 Specifically, the trial judge
22. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 42, at 90.
23. 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 20, 1 608[05], at 608-45 (listing examples).
24. See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 481 n.18 (1948).
25. State v. Rutchik, 116 Wis. 2d 61, 76 n.9, 341 N.W.2d 639, 646 n.9 (1984) (quoting 3A J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 987, at 910 (Chadbourn rev. 1970)).
26. WIs. STAT. § 906.09(3). The hearing is mandatory. Gyrion v. Bauer, 132 Wis. 2d 434,
438, 393 N.W.2d 107, 109 (Ct. App. 1986) ("We conclude that § 906.09(3) prohibits the introduc-
tion of any evidence with respect to criminal convictions until the trial court has ruled on the
admissibility of the evidence.").
1989]
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must be satisfied that in fact there is sufficient evidence establishing the wit-
ness' prior criminal conviction.27 The judge must then determine which
convictions will be allowed for impeachment purposes.
There is no requirement that the prior convictions themselves have a
bearing on the witness' truthfulness. Wisconsin law embraces the idea that
people convicted of crimes are, as a class, deemed less worthy of belief than
those with no criminal record. The rule may also emanate from the public
policy concern that a witness with a criminal background should not be
allowed to hold himself out to a jury as having led a blameless life. This
follows from the observation that a jury, unless otherwise informed, will
ordinarily assume that a witness has no prior record. Thus, the rule seems
to also function as a protection against unwarranted inferences of good
character.28
The assumption built into Section 906.09 is that the longer the record,
the less truthful the individual.29 This reasoning applies regardless of the
nature of the prior conviction. For example, a prior homicide or burglary
conviction may be used to impeach a witness; it is not necessary to demon-
strate any particular link between the prior conviction and the individual's
character for truthfulness. In order to safeguard against the misuse of this
evidence, the jury is told only of the existence and number of convictions.30
Under Section 906.09, then, the nature of the crime is important only
with respect to the passage of time between the conviction and the time of
testimony. Since Wisconsin law posits a direct relationship between the fact
of conviction and a person's character for truthfulness, it seems to follow
that there is an indirect relationship between the passage of time and the
27. The existence of a criminal record and its admissibility to impeach should be considered
preliminary questions of admissibility for the trial judge to decide by a preponderance of the
evidence. Bouijaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175 (1987); Wis. STAT. § 901.04(1).
28. A parallel is found in Section 906.08. The proponent of a witness cannot introduce evi-
dence of the witness' character for truthfulness until that quality has been controverted by the
opponent. In part, this rule is based on the notion that a jury will assume the witness' basic
veracity until contrary information is brought to its attention. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 7,
§ 49, at 115.
29. Nicholas v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 683, 688, 183 N.W.2d 11, 14 (1971).
The fact of prior convictions and the number thereof is relevant evidence because the law
in Wisconsin presumes that one who has been convicted of a crime is less likely to be a
truthful witness than one who has not been convicted. In addition, the number of prior
convictions is also held to be relevant evidence on the issue of credibility because the more
often one has been convicted, the less truthful he is presumed to be. This presumption
obtains in both civil and criminal litigation.
Id. (citation omitted).
30. The danger of misuse involves the risk that the jury will use the testimony for something
other than assessing the witness' veracity. In particular, the fear is that the trier of fact will infer
that the witness has a propensity for engaging in bad or harmful conduct.
[Vol. 73:283
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nature of the conviction. For example, misdemeanor offenses carrying
nominal dispositions such as a fine or a weekend in jail would seem to lose
whatever probative value they have after a passage of eight or ten years with
no intervening contacts. A conviction for a serious felony which carries a
prison sentence, such as armed robbery, retains its probative value for a
much longer period of time.3' Where multiple convictions exist, and the
court is determining whether they can be used for impeachment, considera-
tion should be given not only to the nature of the convictions, the passage of
time between the convictions and the time of the testimony, but also to the
frequency of the convictions. The final count of convictions is a product of
the trial court's discretion based on the particular facts of the case.
Once the trial court determines the number of convictions that can be
used, and while still outside the jury's presence, it should instruct the wit-
ness and the parties about the permissible limits of impeachment. Wiscon-
sin law contemplates two questions on this subject: (1) "Have you ever
been convicted of a crime?"; and (2) "How many times have you been con-
victed?" In short, the only relevant inquiries involve the existence and the
number of convictions as determined by the trial court. The witness should
be told by the judge how to answer these questions so that the testimony
31. Obviously, this exercise of discretion lacks mathematical precision and is subject to the
fluid balancing test of Section 904.03 of the Wisconsin Statutes. Although the prime considera-
tion is the passage of time, the court should also consider the nature of the conviction in light of
the lapse of time. As a rule of thumb, the less serious the offense, the more attenuated over time is
its value as impeaching evidence. This approach seems justified in light of the converse proposi-
tion, recognized in Nicholas, 49 Wis. 2d at 688, 183 N.W.2d at 14, that the more convictions, the
less trustworthy the witness.
When assessing the passage of time, it should be remembered that Wisconsin's Section 906.09,
unlike Rule 609 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, does not set forth any time limits for gauging
the admissibility of prior convictions. Rule 609(b) subjects convictions which are older than 10
years to special scrutiny:
(b) Time Limit. Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if a period of
more than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or of the release of the
witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever is the later date,
unless the court determines, in the interests of justice, that the probative value of the con-
viction supported by specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial
effect. However, evidence of a conviction more than 10 years old as calculated herein, is
not admissible unless the proponent gives to the adverse party sufficient advance written
notice of intent to use such evidence to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to
contest the use of such evidence.
This is fully justified since, under federal impeachment practice, the jury is informed of the nature
of the conviction. See infra note 35 and accompanying text. Given the critical differences in the
wording of Wisconsin's Section 906.09 and Rule 609 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, as well as
the disparate impeachment practices, neither the federal case law precedent on this point nor the
ten-year rule should control the administration of Section 906.09.
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before the jury does not become sidetracked into collateral inquiries about
the nature of the criminal record.3
2
The rule allows the impeaching party to go beyond the two questions if
the witness' response to them is "wrong" or so equivocal as to appear de-
ceptive. 33 In this event, the cross-examiner is allowed to explore the nature
and date of the conviction in the presence of the jury for the limited pur-
pose, in theory, of fleshing out the correct number of convictions. Upon
request, the jury should be instructed that the prior convictions cannot be
used for any purpose other than impeachment.
This procedure applies in civil and criminal trials. Certain problems
have recurred in the civil context, however, which seem to indicate that the
practice is followed more rigorously in criminal trials than in civil cases.
These problems occur where the parties fail to conduct a subsection
906.09(3) hearing and the cross-examiner went beyond the two permissible
questions primarily because a dispute arose over the proper number of prior
convictions.34
If proper procedures are followed this collateral inquiry should almost
never occur. The purpose of the subsection 906.09(3) hearing is to resolve
such matters. Once the judge determines the number of convictions which
may be used to impeach the witness, the judge should tell the witness how
to answer the two questions. Similarly, the parties are then placed on no-
tice with respect to what information can be put before the jury. If the
witness answers the two questions as directed by the judge, this ends the
inquiry.
Clearly, the Wisconsin "counting rule" is radically different from the
federal practice. Under the corresponding federal rule, impeachment by
prior conviction involves disclosing the nature of the conviction to the
jury.35 The judge then instructs the jury that the prior conviction may be
32. Rutchik, 116 Wis. 2d at 66, 341 N.W.2d at 642.
33. Nicholas, 49 Wis. 2d at 689, 183 N.W.2d at 14.
34. Voith v. Buser, 83 Wis. 2d 540, 544, 266 N.W.2d 304, 306 (1978); Gyrion, 132 Wis. 2d at
437, 393 N.W.2d at 109. The need for a subsection 906.09(3) hearing is particularly critical in
civil cases, because the existence of the witness' criminal record may turn on the recollection of
the witness and diligence of counsel in turning up supporting documentatios. In criminal cases
the process is usually expedited because police officers can run record checks on witnesses. With-
out this "luxury" in civil cases, the court must closely scrutinize the evidence that is presented.
35. In Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 1981, 1992-93 (1989), the
Court held that a witness' felony conviction occurring within ten years of the date of testimony is
automatically admissible for impeachment purposes. This evidence is not subject to any balancing
test set forth in Rules 609 or 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Following the opinion in
Green, the Supreme Court amended Rule 609 to allow application of the Rule 403 balancing test
to all witnesses (other than the criminal defendant). 110 S. Ct. CXXXI (effective December 1,
1990).
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used only to assess the witness' credibility and not for any other purpose.
This model of prior crimes, impeachment ordinarily demands that some
linkage be shown between the nature of the conviction and the character
trait for trustworthiness. Wisconsin's categorical approach obviates the
need for such a showing because the jury is not informed of the nature of
the conviction in the usual case.
Any form of impeachment by prior criminal conviction raises the risk
that the jury might use the evidence for improper purposes. The Wisconsin
practice may, however, more effectively reduce the risk precisely because
the jury is deliberately kept ignorant about the nature of the criminal rec-
ord. The counting rule is calculated to alert the jury to the fact that the
witness has a criminal past, but literally leaves the jury guessing about the
nature of the crimes. The jury's palpable ignorance of the criminal record
carries its own warning against using the evidence for forbidden purposes.
The counting rule is an especially effective compromise where the prior con-
viction concerns conduct which is closely related to the controversy being
tried. 6
B. Character as Circumstantial Evidence of Conduct in Civil Cases
The law of evidence reflects society's penchant for attaching character
labels to individuals. An inevitable by-product of this labelling process is
the temptation to infer that the individual has acted (or will act) in con-
formity with that character trait on other occasions. For example, we often
speak of people who are "poor drivers" or who are "careless." From this
generalized disposition the inference can be made that the subject drove
poorly or acted carelessly on a given occasion.
Although seductively easy to draw, the inference is often a weak one. A
poor driving record does not mean inexorably that every accident the sub-
ject is involved in, or even a majority of them, is his fault.37 The danger is
that the trier of fact might give this evidence more weight than it deserves,
particularly in the absence of other compelling evidence bearing on the spe-
cific matter under litigation. It has also been observed that this kind of
evidence might serve to dilute the burden of proof, making it "easier" for
36. See, eg., Voith, 83 Wis. 2d at 546, 266 N.W.2d at 304 (civil assault action sparked by a
quarrel over a credit card in a store; held that it was error to inform the jury that the defendant
had been convicted of a criminal offense involving a credit card twenty-three years earlier; "[t]he
prior conviction, improperly admitted, could only have the effect of prejudicing the jury by indi-
cating a propensity to commit a crime involving the misuse of a credit card.").
37. For a discussion of "carelessness" and accident proneness, see C. McCoRMICK, supra
note 7, § 189, at 554.
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triers of fact to decide against a party with a tarnished background.3" Fi-
nally, the courts have been justifiably concerned about the amount of time
and resources that may be invested inquiring into an area bearing such mar-
ginal probative value.39
For these reasons, Section 904.04 precludes the use of character evi-
dence in civil cases as circumstantial proof that the person acted in con-
formity with that character trait on a particular occasion.4  This use of
character evidence is restricted solely to criminal cases under the scenarios
described in subsection 904.04(1).41 In civil cases, the sole exception con-
cerns a witness's character for truthfulness, as discussed in the preceding
section.
There is, however, some authority from other jurisdictions which sup-
ports the circumstantial use of character to prove conduct in civil cases
where the underlying action concerns a fraud or other quasi-criminal con-
duct.42 Although the Wisconsin courts have not had the opportunity to
38. R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 162 (2d ed. 1983).
39. When character is placed in contention, the door is opened to a parade of witnesses with
opinions or knowledge, real or imagined, of the subject's reputation in the community. Besides
the time that is devoted to this testimony on direct examination, the cross-examiner may wish to
delve into unsavory specific instances of contrary behavior by the subject. See Wis. STAT.
§ 904.05(2). Not only does this divert the attention of the trier of fact, but court time will inevita-
bly be spent hashing out the permissible boundaries of such a cross-examination, since the propo-
nent will most likely object to any such assault.
40. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 189, at 556 ("The prevailing pattern now is to exclude all
forms of character evidence in civil cases where the evidence is employed merely to support an
inference that conduct on a particular occasion was consistent with a person's character."); 2 J.
WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 404[03], at 404-22 (1989) ("Rule 404...
adopts the orthodox position of rejecting evidence of character in civil actions offered as a basis for
inferring an act."); 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVI-
DENCE § 5234, at 365 (1978) ("Rule 404(a) should be interpreted to bar the use of character
evidence in any case where the ultimate fact to be proved requires an inference from the character
of the person to her conduct 'in conformity therewith on a particular occasion.' ").
41. WiS. STAT. § 904.04(1) states:
(1) CHARACTER EVIDENCE GENERALLY. Evidence of a person's character or a trait of
his character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity
therewith on a particular occasion, except:
(a) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of his character offered by
an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same;
(b) Character of victim. Except as provided in § 972.11(2), evidence of a pertinent
trait of character of the victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution
to rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the victim offered
by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the victim was the first
aggressor;
(c) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided in
§§ 906.07, 906.08 and 906.09.
42. 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 40, § 5236, at 387:
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squarely address this issue, the weight of authority strongly suggests that
civil litigants cannot use this inference regardless of the nature of the under-
lying claim.43 This conclusion is consistent with Wisconsin cases antedat-
ing the rules of evidence and other authority suggesting that Section 904.04
continues to reflect those earlier holdings.'
In summary, proof of reputation, opinion testimony, and specific in-
stances of conduct are inadmissible in all civil actions as proof of character
and the inference that the subject behaved in accordance with that charac-
ter trait.45
C. Proof of Character as Relevant to Something Other Than Conduct in
Conformity
Section 904.04 does not bar all circumstantial uses of character in civil
cases. It precludes only the circumstantial use of character to prove con-
A more intriguing question is whether the word "accused" refers only to a defendant in a
criminal action or whether it can also be interpreted to apply to a party in a civil action
who is accused of engaging in criminal conduct. There are a growing number of cases at
common law that would permit a civil litigant to use his own good character to defend
against such accusations. Some writers have assumed that the use of the word "accused"
was designed to limit the scope of Rule 404(a)(1) to criminal cases. Though not an unrea-
sonable assumption, it seems debatable when it is noted that in some of the other rules in
which the word is used the drafters have also added an explicit limitation to criminal cases.
Moreover, while the Advisory Committee Note makes a powerful argument against the use
of character evidence in civil actions, it is rather coy about the scope of that argument. On
the other hand, the use of the word "prosecution" and the intent of the drafters to codify
the common law will probably lead most courts to conclude that the rule cannot be inter-
preted to incorporate the minority rule permitting the use of character evidence when
criminal conduct is in issue in a civil case.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
43. 2 J. WEiNsTEIn & M. BERGER, supra note 40, % 404[03], at 404-25 ("It is not possible,
particularly in view of the Advisory Committee's note, to read Rule 404(a)(1) and (2) as permit-
ting evidence of character in a civil case if the conduct involved would be a crime."). The perti-
nent Wisconsin rules are virtually identical to their federal counterparts. See Wis. STAT.
§ 904.04.
44. The Judicial Council Committee's note to Section 904.04 observes that "[t]he general ban
on character evidence to prove that a person acted in conformity therewith on a particular occa-
sion is consistent with Wisconsin ases.. . ." The note cited Eisenberg v. Continental Casualty
Co., 48 Wis. 2d 637, 646, 180 N.W.2d 726, 730 (1970) (quoting 32 C.J.S. EVIDENCE § 426, at 37-
38 (1964)), to support the general rule that:
[a] party is not entitled to introduce evidence of his good character, in the first instance,
merely because his adversary has, by the pleadings or the nature of the action, charged him
with committing a legal wrong, or even an act for which he might be subjected to a crimi-
nal prosecution, as, for example,... fraud....
Id
45. The only exception concerns the character of a witness for truthfulness. See supra notes
16-36 and accompanying text.
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duct in conformity with the trait. The rule does not prohibit the use of
character to prove something other than a propensity to behave in a certain
way. Of course, this other purpose must be relevant.
For instance, in an action for assault and battery, the defendant may
show that at the time of the assault he was aware of plaintiff's reputation
for violence. The defendant's knowledge of plaintiff's combative nature or
prior acts of violence may be relevant to prove that the defendant acted out
of fear of the plaintiff and in self-defense; it would not be admissible to
prove that the plaintiff had a violent disposition and was therefore more
likely to be the first aggressor. Thus, the plaintiff's reputation may be of-
fered to prove the defendant's state of mind, but not to prove that the plain-
tiff was a violent person and therefore more likely the first aggressor.46
This example presents the problem of limited admissibility of evidence.
Although fully admissible for one purpose, such as providing the defend-
ant's state of mind, the danger is that the jury will misuse it as proof of the
plaintiff's conduct on a particular occasion. The rules attempt to accom-
modate these concerns through the use of limiting instructions and the
46. Lowe v. Ring, 123 Wis. 107, 113, 101 N.W. 381, 383 (1904). Lowe involved a civil bat-
tery case in which evidence of prior violent behavior by the plaintiff was admitted on the issue of
self-defense:
It is the general rule that evidence of a party's character is not admissible in civil actions
for damage unless his character is directly in issue - as in slander, seduction, and other
cases - "even though the cause is one for which a criminal prosecution may be brought,
or where the offense set up in justification involves a crime".... This general rule does not
go to the extent of excluding such evidence for all purposes. As stated in [a prior case],
plaintiff's general reputation as a man of quarrelsome and violent disposition, if within the
knowledge of a defendant before an affray, is competent evidence to go to the jury upon the
issue of self-defense.
Id. at 113-14, 101 N.W. at 383 (citations omitted); see 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note
40, 1 404[03], at 404-22 (Rule 404's ban on the use of character evidence does not apply where it is
relevant to something other than proof of the actor's conduct through the character inference); 22
C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 40, § 5239, at 459 ("The general rule of exclusion applies
only when the evidence is offered to prove (1) 'the character of a person;' and (2) 'that he acted in
conformity therewith.' Both elements are required."); see also Meke v. Nicol, 56 Wis. 2d 654, 661,
203 N.W.2d 129, 133 (1973) where the court noted:
The primary question before the jury was whether defendant had actually intended to
shoot the plaintiff and, if so, whether he was acting in self-defense. This intent must be
collected by the jury from the circumstances of the case. On the other hand, evidence of
the general character or reputation of the parties in an action for assault and battery may
not be introduced merely for the purpose of raising a presumption favorable to one party
or unfavorable to the other.
Id. (citations omitted).
In self-defense cases, civil and criminal, neither the character of the victim nor the defendant is
an "essential element" of the defense (or claim) such that character is "at issue." See infra notes
49-55 and accompanying text; see also Werner v. State, 66 Wis. 2d 736, 744 n.6, 226 N.W.2d 402,
406 n.6 (1975).
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court's power to exclude the evidence under Section 904.03 if convinced
that the probative value of the evidence for the legitimate purpose is sub-
stantially outweighed by the dangers of misuse.4 7
Thus, the principle of multiple admissibility of evidence (i.e., that evi-
dence may be relevant to more than one proposition) and its corollary, the
idea of limited admissibility, function to permit the use of character evi-
dence to establish something other than the actor's propensity."a The most
common example of limited admissibility in this setting is found where
character is at issue.
D. Character at Issue in the Litigation
Character evidence is also admissible to prove a trait which is an essen-
tial element of the claim or defense. Here character is not used as circum-
stantial evidence of the subject's conduct on another occasion, but is itself
directly in issue under the applicable substantive law.49 Put still another
way, "character" is one of the ultimate facts which the jury must determine
in order to decide the validity of the claim or defense. Where the evidence
is directly relevant to prove character in this sense, Section 904.04 is wholly
inapplicable. The relevance of the evidence stems from a character trait
itself being a "fact that is of consequence" under Section 904.01.
The prime example of character at issue is the competency of a driver in
an action for injuries caused by the negligent entrustment of a motor vehi-
cle.5" Other examples include the qualifications of a physician in an action
47. Section 901.06 deals with the limited admissibility of evidence. It provides that the op-
posing party is entitled to limiting instruction upon request. The problem is that often these
instructions are of little, if any, value. See 21 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5063, at 308-09 (1977).
48. Id. § 5063.
49. McMorris v. State, 58 Wis. 2d 144, 148, 205 N.W.2d 559, 561 (1973) ("[I]n civil cases it
has been recognized that a person's possession of a particular character trait may be an operative
fact which under the substantive law determines the legal rights and liabilities of the parties and,
where that character trait is in issue, that trait of character may be open to proof, including a
showing of specific acts."); FED. R. EVID. 404, Federal Advisory Committee's Note ("Character
may be itself an element of a crime, claim, or defense.... Illustrations are: the chastity of the
victim under a statute specifying her chastity as an element of the crime of seduction, or the
competency of the driver in an action for negligently entrusting a motor vehicle to an incompetent
driver."); 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 40, § 5235, at 368 ("This means that under
the substantive law and the pleading in the case, character is an element of the cause of action,
crime or defense and thus an ultimate fact to be proved rather than simply circumstantial evidence
of some ultimate fact.").
50. FED. R. EvID. 404, Federal Advisory Committee's Note; see Bankert v. Threshermen's
Mut. Ins. Co., 110 Wis. 2d 469, 474, 329 N.W.2d 150, 152 (1983) (negligent entrustment claim
involving parental liability for damages caused by minor driver, the court observed that liability
could arise where the entrusted driver was "incompetent"). "Incompetence" in one's driving calls
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against a hospital for the negligent hiring of the doctor;51 the character of
the deceased in a wrongful death action where plaintiff seeks loss of consor-
tium;52 the "want of chastity" in an action for seduction; and, plaintiff's
bad character in defamation actions relating to statements about plaintiff's
character.5 3
In theory, the character evidence is received solely on the essential ele-
ment. If received for this limited purpose it cannot be used as circumstan-
tial evidence of conduct, assuming there has been a timely objection or
into question the driver's ability to safely drive the vehicle under all circumstances, which leads to
generalizations about drivers as good/bad, safe/unsafe.
51. Johnson v. Misericordia Community Hosp., 99 Wis. 2d 708, 737, 301 N.W.2d 156, 171
(1981) (action against a hospital which had a duty "to exercise reasonable care to permit only
competent medical doctors the privilege of using [its] facilities;" the court also permitted a variety
of detailed inquiries into the particular doctor's training, experience, and reputation in the medical
community as it bore on his competence and on the hospital's knowledge).
Character may also be at issue in an action predicated on the negligent supervision of an
employee. See the cases collected at 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 40, § 5235, at 352
(1989 Supp.).
52. Strelecki v. Firemans Ins. Co. of Newark, 88 Wis. 2d 464, 480, 276 N.W.2d 794, 801
(1979) (wrongful death action in which plaintiff sought damages for her pecuniary loss and the
loss of society and companionship resulting from her husband's death; applying Sections 904.01
and 904.03, the court held that "evidence regarding [the deceased's] personal conduct dealing
with his periodic hospitalization for alcoholism, his fighting and assaulting his wife, mother and
son, his extramarital activities, his attempts to molest his daughter, his suicidal tendencies and
lack of marital sex with [his wife]" were relevant to the claim for loss of society and companion-
ship; certain other misdeeds by the deceased were found to have been irrelevant to this claim, but
their introduction was harmless).
There is some dispute about whether character is actually at issue in a wrongful death action
involving damage claims for losses other than that of society and companionship. 22 C. WRIGHT
& K. GRAHAM, supra note 40, § 5235, at 370.
[W]here evidence of the character of the deceased is offered as proof of the likelihood that
he would have supported the plaintiff in a wrongful death action, Rule 404 does not apply
because the evidence is not offered to prove 'that he acted in conformity therewith on a
particular occasion.' But this is not, as some writers have implied, an example of character
in issue; the issue is plaintiff's damage, not the character of the deceased.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also C. MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 188, at 553 n.2.
Although the net result is that character evidence is admissible under either view, the distinc-
tion is critical. Section 904.05 permits the proponent to use specific instances of conduct, as well
as reputation and opinion witnesses, to prove character where character is at issue. It precludes,
however, the use of specific instances of conduct to show character where character is used as
circumstantial evidence of conduct, including as proof of future financial support. Thus, the dif-
ference is found in the permissible forms of proof.
53. For the authorities cited for the propositions regarding actions for seduction and for defa-
mation of plaintiff's character, see McMorris, 58 Wis. 2d at 148-49 n.5, 205 N.W.2d at 561 n.5
(dicta).
CHARACTER, HABIT, AND SIMILAR ACTS
request to limit the use of the evidence. The risk of jury misuse remains,
but the danger is allayed somewhat by the use of limiting instructions. 54
For instance, assume that in a medical malpractice action the plaintiff
sues the treating physician for having negligently caused certain damages.
Plaintiff also ifies a claim against the hospital which employed the defend-
ant doctor for having negligently granted privileges to an incompetent phy-
sician (the defendant doctor). The latter claim requires proof, as an element
of plaintiff's prima facie case, that the hospital knew or should have known
that the defendant doctor was incompetent when privileges were extended.
This may entail opinion or reputation testimony about the doctor's lacklus-
ter ability to practice medicine. Specific instances of substandard practice
may also be admitted to prove the doctor's incompetence and the hospital's
notice.55
Consequently, proof by opinion, reputation, and specific instances of
substandard practices will be admitted solely for the limited purpose of
proving the competence issue in the claim against the hospital. It cannot, at
least in theory, be used against the defendant doctor as proof of negligence
on the particular occasion. Where the two claims are joined together in a
single trial, the distinction between the permissible and impermissible use of
the evidence will no doubt blur in the minds of jurors. It is perhaps more
likely that they will use it for the improper purpose than the permissible
purpose, since the former may be more in harmony with how people typi-
cally use such information in everyday life. Nevertheless, the court will
assume that the jury can and will follow a limiting instruction directing
them to use the evidence only for the permissible purpose. The risk that the
jury might misuse the evidence is often outweighed by the cost of separate
trials.
54. This is an example of the doctrine of limited admissibility. See WIs. STAT. § 901.06. Of
course the evidence is received for this limited purpose only if opposing counsel objects or moves
for a limiting instruction in a timely manner. The failure to do either allows that the evidence to
be received for any relevant purpose.
55. The example in the text is based on Johnson, 99 Wis. 2d at 708, 301 N.W.2d at 156.
Section 904.05 governs the permissible methods of proving character where permitted by the law
of evidence. Where character is "at issue," the rule allows the proponent to prove the trait
through all three recognized methods of character proof: reputation, opinion, and specific in-
stances. The opponent is accorded the same latitude in attacking the existence of the trait.
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III. EVIDENCE OF SIMILAR ACCIDENTS, OTHER CRIMES, WRONGS OR
ACTS IN CIVIL CASES
A. Other Act Evidence: General Considerations
Subsections 904.04(2) and Section 904.03 control the admissibility of
evidence concerning other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Admission of this type
of evidence is the most frequently litigated question arising under the
rules.56 Although the vast majority of the appellate cases are criminal, sub-
section 904.04(2) also applies to civil actions, such as where a plaintiff at-
tempts to use evidence of similar accidents in a products liability action.
Subsection 904.04(2) performs a dual function. First, it precludes the
use of such acts as "character evidence" to prove a person's propensity to
behave in a certain way; in short, it reiterates the general ban against the
use of an inference from character to conduct in conformity therewith. Its
second function is to clarify the proposition that such evidence may be used
for any other relevant purpose.5 7 This second function, while simple to
state, is exasperatingly difficult to administer.
The first sentence of subsection 904.04(2) describes the forbidden pro-
pensity inference and precludes its use, subject implicitly to the exceptions
set forth elsewhere in the rule and in situations where character is at issue.58
The next sentence articulates the second function of the rule; other act evi-
dence is admissible if its relevance does not turn on the forbidden inference.
Subsection 904.04(2) also lists a series of evidentiary propositions which do
not violate the propensity rule, such as using other acts to prove motive,
opportunity, preparation, etc. The listing is only illustrative, not exhaus-
tive.59 Courts are not required to pigeonhole or "jam" the other act evi-
dence into one of the enumerated categories. As long as the evidence is
relevant and otherwise admissible apart from the circumstantial inference
from character to conduct, Section 904.04 sanctions its use.'
56. See Comment, supra note 14, at 320.
57. The admissibility of this evidence must pass scrutiny under Section 904.03 and any other
applicable rules of evidence.
58. Specifically, subsection 904.04(1) sets forth the circumstances under which the inference
from character to conduct may be used in criminal cases.
59. State v. Shillcut, 116 Wis. 2d 227, 236, 341 N.W.2d 716, 720 (Ct. App. 1983), aff'd, 119
Wis. 2d 788, 350 N.W.2d 686 (1984) (court held that the listing of circumstances under subsection
904.04(2) is not exclusionary but, rather, illustrative.).
60. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 183, at 538; 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra
note 40, § 5240, at 471 ("Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible if it is not offered
to prove the conduct of the actor by way of an inference as to his character, without regard to
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The language of subsection 904.04(2) describes evidence of other
"crimes, wrongs, or acts."'" The incident need not have resulted in a con-
viction or civil judgment, nor must it have been a "bad" act. 2 The other
act may have occurred prior or subsequent to the incident which is being
litigated. 3 Moreover, the other act may be that of a party, a witness, or a
third person. The prime criterion for admission is relevance.
Regardless of the nature of the other act, basic principles of relevancy
demand some proof that the other act actually occurred. This presents a
question of conditional relevancy. In assessing the sufficiency of the proof
showing the occurrence of the other act, the judge's role is one of determin-
ing whether there is sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could
find that the other act occurred. 4
whether or not it fits within one of the listed categories."). McCormick noted that the range of
permissible purposes is "almost infinite." C. MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 190, at 448.
The second sentence of Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence is worded differently
than subsection 904.04(2). It begins instead with the phrase: "It may, however, be admissible for
other purposes .... " FED. R. EvID. 404(b). Congress changed the wording of the federal rule in
order to place "greater emphasis" on admissibility of this evidence. FED. R. EVID. 404, Report of
House Committee on the Judiciary, at 284 (West 1989). The difference in wording has made no
discernible difference in the interpretation of the respective rules.
61. Section 904.04(2) is concerned with specific events or incidents which are isolated in time
and place. It seems ill-suited for analyzing general attitudes or states of mind, such as a murder
suspect's "jealousy" of his dead wife. See State v. Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d 681, 712, 370 N.W.2d 745,
760 (1985). The admissibility of "general attitudes or states of mind" should instead focus on
relevancy (Section 904.01), discretionary admissibility (Section 904.03), and whether "character"
has been placed implicitly into dispute (subsection 904.04(1)).
62. Whitty v. State, 34 Wis. 2d 278, 293, 149 N.W.2d 557, 564 (1966), cert. denied, Whitty v.
Wisconsin, 390 U.S. 959 (1968) ("It is not necessary that prior-crimes [sic] evidence be in the form
of a conviction; evidence of the incident, crime or occurrence is sufficient."). The other act need
not involve anything illegal or wrongful. State v. Rosenfeld, 93 Wis. 2d 325, 331-32, 286 N.W.2d
596, 599 (1980) (where the defendant attempted unsuccessfully to bribe a town board member into
initiating an anti-public housing resolution, the trial court properly admitted evidence that ten
months later another board member, with no connection to the defendant, introduced the same
resolution; this act showed that the town board had cognizance over such matters, as required by
the bribery statute).
63. Although this evidence is sometimes referred to as "prior" acts evidence, nothing in the
language or logic of the rule limits it to events antedating the matter in dispute. The touchstone is
relevance. See, e.g., Barrera v. State, 99 Wis. 2d 269, 298 N.W.2d 820 (1980), cert. denied, Bar-
rera v. Wisconsin, 451 U.S. 972 (1981).
64. In Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 692 (1988), the Court held:
In the Rule 404(b) context, similar act evidence is relevant only if the jury can reasonably
conclude that the act occurred and that the defendant was the actor. In the instant case,
the evidence that petitioner was selling the televisions was relevant under the Govern-
ment's theory only if the jury could reasonably find that the televisions were stolen.
Such questions of relevance conditioned on a fact are dealt with under Federal Rule of
Evidence 104(b) .... In determining whether the Government has introduced sufficient
evidence to meet Rule 104(b), the trial court neither weighs credibility nor makes a finding
that the Government has proved the conditional fact by a preponderance of the evidence.
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Once satisfied that there is sufficient evidence of the other act's occur-
rence, the trial court must assess the act's admissibility under subsection
904.04(2) and Section 904.03. This entails a three-step analysis:
1. Is the other act relevant (i.e., is it probative of the proposition it is
offered to prove)?65
2. Does this use of other act evidence run afoul of the forbidden infer-
ence (i.e., is it relevant to something other than an inference running from
character to conduct in conformity)?66
3. Is the probative value of the other act evidence substantially out-
weighed by the considerations set forth in Section 904.03?67
The court simply examines all the evidence in the case and decides whether the jury could
reasonably find the conditional fact - here, that the televisions were stolen - by a prepon-
derance of the evidence.
Id. (citations omitted). This standard was adopted in State v. Schindler, 146 Wis. 2d 47, 53-54,
429 N.W.2d 110, 113 (Ct. App. 1988).
65. The first step involves an ordinary relevancy analysis under Section 904.01. The propo-
nent must identify the proposition that the other act is offered to prove, show that it is "of conse-
quence" to the action, and that the evidence has some tendency to make the proposition more (or
less) likely. Whether evidence is relevant rests within the discretion of the trial court.
66. The second step requires that the trial court determine whether the proffered use of the
evidence violates the propensity rule. The proponent must convince the judge that the other act
evidence has relevance apart from its tendency to shed light on the subject's character. One must
remember that other act evidence will almost always be relevant to the subject's character and the
inference that he acted in conformity therewith. The real questions are whether it is also proba-
tive of some other proposition that is of consequence to the action and, if so, whether it is being
used for that purpose.
There is a tendency manifest in the case law to collapse the first and second steps into a single
inquiry. The failure to carefully separate the two often devolves into a result-oriented approach in
which a "non-character" proposition, such as intent, is invoked simply to rationalize the admis-
sion of the evidence. Absent is any close scrutiny into the relevancy of the evidence apart from the
inference that the subject behaved in accordance with a character trait. See 22 C. WRIGHT & K.
GRAHAM, supra note 40, § 5239, at 427-68.
67. The trial court must balance the probative value of the evidence against the dangers of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, and considerations of undue delay
and waste of time.
In this context "unfair prejudice" refers to the risk that the jury will draw the forbidden
inference despite a limiting instruction. See State v. Fishnick, 127 Wis. 2d 247, 261-62, 378
N.W.2d 272, 280 (1985) where the court noted:
The legal prejudice of which we speak here is the potential harm in a jury's concluding that
because an actor committed one bad act, he necessarily committed the crime with which he
is now charged. A trial court must determine whether a jury will prejudge a defendant's
guilt or innocence in an action because of his prior bad act.
Id. (citations omitted).
Any decision will turn on the particular evidentiary context before the court, but of primary
concern is whether the proposition for which the evidence is offered is in substantial dispute. See
Wis. STAT. § 904.04, Judicial Council Committee's Note (1974) (other act evidence "should be
excluded if the motive, opportunity, intent, etc., is not substantially disputed ... ").
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This three-step analysis applies to all uses of other act evidence in civil
and criminal cases, regardless of the proposition the evidence is used to
establish.68 The proponent of the evidence bears the burden of convincing
the trial judge that the test has been satisfied.6 9 The trial court's analysis
should be carefully explained and placed on the record. 0 Upon request, a
limiting instruction should be given to the jury, preferably at the time the
evidence is introduced.
Neither the rule nor the case law construing it require the proponent to
give pretrial notice of an intent to use other act evidence. The absence of
any such notice may, however, be a factor in determining if the evidence
should be allowed under Section 904.03. The court should also consider
whether the other act was subject to discovery. Where opposing counsel is
surprised by the evidence, a continuance may be necessary to effectively
68. It applies even where the other act is only "implicit" in the evidence. State v. Draize, 88
Wis. 2d 445, 276 N.W.2d 784 (1979) (drunk driving prosecution; the state introduced testimony
that, when defendant took the breath test, defendant remarked that he had taken one before; held
that this implied the existence of a prior arrest for the same conduct, thus raising the question of
other crimes evidence; any error, however, was harmless).
Some cases setting forth the test for admissibility speak in terms that suggest that the analysis
is mandatory whenever other act evidence is put before the jury. State v. Pharr, 115 Wis. 2d 334,
343-44, 340 N.W.2d 498, 502 (1983). Other cases have, however, found a waiver where opposing
counsel failed to object to the evidence. Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d at 719, 370 N.W.2d at 763; Kwosek v.
State, 60 Wis. 2d 276, 282, 208 N.W.2d 308, 311 (1973) (waiver of Section 904.03 objection where
counsel failed to object specifically on that ground).
The nature of this evidence strongly favors the position that, at least in criminal cases, the test
should be applied regardless of an objection, unless both parties stipulate to its admissibility.
Although the failure to object normally means that there is a "waiver" of any error, an appellate
court may still have to review the admissibility of the other act evidence through the avenues of
plain error, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, or by deciding whether a new trial should
be ordered in the interest of justice. See generally Comment, supra note 14, at 324-25. In civil
cases, a failure to object should be treated as a waiver of any right to object to this evidence.
69. The three-step test analysis presents a preliminary question of the admissibility of evi-
dence; the test is to be applied by the trial judge, not the trier of fact. See Wis. STAT. § 901.04(1).
70. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has frequently reminded trial courts of their obligation to
fully explain their decisions on the record, and has explained the consequences of a failure to do
so. See Pharr, 115 Wis. 2d at 343, 340 N.W.2d at 502 ("[W]e hold that, where the trial court fails
to set forth its reasoning in exercising its discretion to admit evidence, the appellate court should
independently review the record to determine whether it provides a basis for the trial court's
exercise of discretion.").
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rebut it or place the incident in its proper context.71 This "waste of time"
may not be worth the probative value of the evidence.72
The other act evidence may be admitted at any point during the trial
once the court is satisfied that the three-step test has been met. Although
the use of this evidence is not categorically restricted to the rebuttal phase
of the trial, its relevance often will not crystalize until both sides have
presented their case-in-chief. Pretrial conferences in civil actions, as well as
other discovery tools, may assist in identifying what issues will surface at
trial, and may facilitate the court's decision on the admissibility of the evi-
dence. The timing of the introduction of this evidence rests within the trial
court's broad discretion.73
B. Other Act Evidence in Civil Cases
Perhaps because the issue is most frequently encountered in criminal
cases, it is often overlooked that the three-step analysis described above ap-
plies in civil cases as well.74 Wisconsin cases fall into a pattern seen in other
71. It is suggested that the pretrial order be formulated to require the disclosure of a party's
intent to use other act evidence. The order should mandate that the other acts be specifically
described, and the source of the proof identified. It should also require that counsel explain the
relevance of the evidence in light of the three-step analysis described above. Such a requirement
might forestall weak or frivolous proffers of evidence and better enable the trial court to formulate
its ruling on admissibility. Moreover, if counsel cannot explain what he or she is trying to accom-
plish with the evidence, why should the task devolve to the trial or appellate court?
72. The standard of review on appeal is one of abuse of discretion. The trial court's decision
and analysis should be placed on the record. Fishnick, 127 Wis. 2d at 257, 378 N.W.2d at 278
("But the record must reflect that discretion was exercised, including evidence that the trial judge
undertook a reasonable inquiry and examination of the facts as the basis for his decision."); 22 C.
WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 40, § 5250, at 544.
73. The trial court has considerable discretion in controlling the flow and timing of evidence
during the trial. See WIs. STAT. § 906.11(1); State v. Harris, 123 Wis. 2d 231, 365 N.W.2d 922
(Ct. App. 1985) (discussing other authority that permits the prosecution to use the other act
evidence in its case-in-chief if it is used to show that the defendant committed the crime, but
otherwise restricts such evidence to the rebuttal case where it is used to show only knowledge or
intent); State v. King, 120 Wis. 2d 285, 354 N.W.2d 742 (Ct. App. 1984) (clarifying that other act
evidence may be admitted in either the case-in-chief or the rebuttal case, depending upon its rele-
vancy to the disputed issues). Although King and Harris are criminal cases, the logic of their
holdings carries over into civil litigation which implicates the same concerns.
74. See 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 40, § 5239, at 443. For instance, the
admissibility of prior accidents is frequently analyzed as a general relevance problem without
recognition that it implicates subsection 904.04(2). Often there is no citation or discussion of the
rule in dealing with this issue. The failure to explicitly consider subsection 904.04(2) may skew
the analysis, as where, for example, prior accidents are admitted as "routine practice" evidence.
In addition, the virtue of the three-step analysis is that it fosters the making of a complete record
for appellate purposes. Finally, resort to subsection 904.04(2) might alleviate some of the strain
placed on the rules governing habit and routine practice, which have been stretched to the break-
ing point.
[Vol. 73:283
CHARACTER, HABIT, AND SIMILAR ACTS
jurisdictions. There is a tendency to treat "other accidents" as a special
problem in relevancy without an explicit recognition that this evidence
poses issues identical to those found in the "other crimes" cases in criminal
litigation.7" Moreover, there is a marked inclination to resort to "habit" or
"routine practice" as a convenient way of justifying the admissibility of this
evidence. The first tendency is unjustified by the rules of evidence; the sec-
ond has created considerable mischief in the case law.
Subsection 904.04(2) provides that evidence of other accidents, injuries,
or acts generally is admissible provided its relevance does not turn on an
inference from character to conduct. In the civil setting, the rule represents
an expansion of the common law doctrine of res inter alios acta, which in its
strictest application precluded any evidence other than that involving the
parties and the event in dispute76 . Subsection 904.04(2) allows the use of
other act evidence whenever it can be done without violating the forbidden
inference. Obvious applications of the rule in civil litigation include evi-
dence regarding the sale of other comparable properties to prove value, or
the introduction of other accidents in personal injury cases.
Where a party seeks to introduce evidence of other accidents or mis-
haps, the court has insisted generally that they be similar to the event in
question. This evidence is most often used to prove the existence of (1) an
unreasonable risk, (2) a defective or dangerous condition, or (3) the cause of
the injuries." Section 904.04 precludes the use of this evidence to establish
a character trait for negligent behavior or lack of due care.7"
75. R. ALLEN & R. KUHNS, supra note 6, at 272.
76. Wis. STAT. § 904.04(2); see 22 C. WRIrHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 40, § 5239, at 443.
In discussing the application of Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the authors write:
Although these illustrations involve criminal cases, it should be noted that the common
law rule was equally applicable in civil cases. Rule 404(b) has a similar scope, since noth-
ing in the rule limits it to criminal cases. The common law rule tended to be overshadowed
in civil cases by the broader, but spurious, doctrine of "res inter alios acta" which pur-
ported to bar evidence of events other than the one at issue. That doctrine was not codified
in the Evidence Rules, although the clause in Rule 404(b) referring to the use of "other
acts" to prove propensity covers some of the ground formerly occupied by the notion of
"res inter alios acta." The "res inter alios acta" rule was not limited to the use of other
incidents to prove propensity; it would be equally applicable to use for one of the excepted
purposes listed in Rule 404(b). Therefore, the net result of the Evidence Rules is to in-
crease the admissibility of evidence of other acts in civil litigation.
Id. (citations omitted).
77. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 200, at 587-90; see Hart v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 371, 392
n.9, 249 N.W.2d 810, 819 n.9 (1977) (suggesting that there may be a character trait for "due care
or lack thereof," but not a "habit" with respect to such behavior). It should be cautioned that this
language in Hart is dicta; the issue was not briefed and the court's discussion was limited to a
short footnote.
78. See supra notes 37-45 and accompanying text.
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Furthermore, the similarity requirement demands only a showing of
"substantial similarity," not an exact replication of events.79 In short, the
main concern is that the other incident be relevant to something other than
a general disposition or propensity to engage in harmful conduct.
79. In Netzel v. State Sand & Gravel Co., 51 Wis. 2d 1, 9-10, 186 N.W.2d 258, 262-63 (1971),
the supreme court stated:
On the issue of establishment of a dangerous defect, appellant asserts it was error for the
trial court to admit evidence that seven other employees had been burned by the same
concrete mix on the same day on the same job. Reliance is upon 1 JONES, EVIDENCE (5th
ed.), sec. 185, at 324, see. 185, where it is stated:
Since evidence of other similar conditions or occurrences under similar circumstances
involves proof of collateral matters, a good deal of discretion is necessarily vested in the
trial judge on the question of whether the evidence should be admitted. The usual consid-
erations of undue distraction or prejudice, surprise, or undue consumption of time are
inherent....
A full quote from Jones on this point should include the paragraph, on page 323, stat-
ing that:
Evidence of other accidents or similar occurrences at the same time or under similar
conditions and circumstances may be admissible to show the probability of the defect in
question, that the injury was caused by the defect and that the person responsible knew or
should have known of the existence of the defect.
While this court has held testimony as to other persons falling on a dance floor inad-
missible as raising collateral matters and not proving the dangerous character of a dance
floor, here, where the issue revolved around whether exposure to ordinary concrete would
or could cause burns, and where both witnesses for appellant and respondent testified that
even continued exposure to ordinary concrete had not caused second and third-degree
burns, we would find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's holding relevant and admis-
sible testimony that seven others were burned on the same day by the same concrete mix.
Both the purpose for which the evidence of other injuries similarly caused and the nature
of the negligence claimed are to be considered in determining whether discretion has been
abused.
Id. at 9, 186 N.W.2d at 262-63 (citations omitted); see also Lobermeier v. General Tel. Co. of
Wisconsin, 119 Wis. 2d 129, 150, 349 N.W.2d 466, 476 (1984) (in an action against a telephone
company for injuries caused by the improper grounding of a telephone, the trial court properly
admitted ten other incidents of similar character: "As plaintiff points out, the similarity between
the ten accidents and the facts of the instant case is obvious. All ten phones were improperly
grounded and hit by lightning which resulted in injury to the user of the phone. All of the phone
installations were those of [the defendant]."). The court in Lobermeier also justified the admission
of this evidence on the ground that it constituted a routine practice under Section 904.06. Id. at
151, 349 N.W.2d at 477. See infra notes 102-110 and accompanying text; City of Franklin v.
Badger Ford Truck Sales, Inc., 58 Wis. 2d 641, 656, 207 N.W.2d 866, 873 (1973) (product liability
action brought by city against the seller and the manufacturers of the chassis and the wheels of a
fire truck for damages incurred when the truck tipped over: "[E]vidence that like products were
free from, or were subject to, defective or injurious condition is generally admissible[,]" but discre-
tion is vested in trial judges to determine whether introduction of such evidence would involve
undue distraction, undue consumption of time or undue introduction of entirely collateral issues
(footnotes omitted)).
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The absence of other accidents, when offered to prove the nonexistence
of the defect or the causal nexus, is subject to the same test.Y' The difficulty
presented by such evidence, however, is in showing that the conditions were
sufficiently similar to warrant the inference that if, for example, the defect
was present, then other accidents would have occurred. Like inferring guilt
from silence, the absence of reports of prior accidents may open the door to
an endless round of speculation, and may be excluded by operation of Sec-
tion 904.03.
Prior accidents or occurrences may also be used to show that a party
had notice of a dangerous condition. Such knowledge may be relevant in
actions sounding in negligence, strict liability, or under a safe place statute.
When other act evidence is used solely to show notice or knowledge, the
need for similarity between the events is not as compelling as it is where the
evidence is used to establish a cause or a condition.81
Closely related is the use of other act evidence to prove a party's state of
mind where intent, willfulness, or malice is in issue. For example, in one
case a teacher brought an action against a student for battery and the stu-
dent's parents for their failure to control him. Plaintiff put in evidence that
the student was involved in five prior fights as probative of his malicious
intent under a claim for punitive damages. The trial court instructed the
jury that the evidence of the prior fights was to be considered only as it had
a bearing on the student's intent, and not to establish the likelihood that he
assaulted the teacher."2
80. See D.L. v. Huebner, 110 Wis. 2d 581, 329 N.W.2d 890 (1983) (a products liability action
sounding in negligence and strict liability). In Huebner, the defendant manufacturer complained
that the trial court erred by excluding evidence of the good safety records of similar products.
The supreme court held that:
[e]vidence denying the happening of an event has been called "negative evidence," and is,
as Huebner Implement argues, admissible. That the evidence negates the occurrence of an
event, such as evidence that there was no hole in the highway, or that there were no similar
accidents with similar wagons, rather than affirms the occurrence of an event does not
render the testimony inadmissible. To be admissible, however, the witness must be in a
position to testify on the basis of personal knowledge or experience that the event did not
occur.
Id. at 622, 329 N.W.2d at 909 (citations omitted); see also C. McCoRMICK, supra note 7, at 591.
81. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 200, at 590. The author states:
Since all that is required is that the previous injury or injuries be such as to call defendant's
attention to the dangerous situation that resulted in the litigated accident, the similarity in
the circumstances of the accidents can be considerably less than that which is demanded
when the same evidence is used for one of the other valid purposes.
Id.
82. Anello v. Savignac, 116 Wis. 2d 246, 251, 342 N.W.2d 440, 442 (Ct. App. 1983)
(although the court of appeals upheld the admission of this evidence, it cited only Section 904.04
19891
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
Related problems arise with respect to evidence that concerns "the prior
part of a continuing act."83 The most frequently recurring example in-
volves testimony about a driver's speed or maneuvers some distance before
the accident scene.84 Factors such as the speed or control of a vehicle can
be modified with a turn of the wheel or a pump of the brake. The concern is
that evidence of the subject's driving sometime prior to the accident may
have relevance only through the subject's character as a driver.85 The same
is not true of conditions such as drowsiness or intoxication, which can per-
sist for miles or over a period of hours.
Since this kind of evidence is closely related, spatially and temporally, to
the subject of the litigation, deciding whether to label it as "other acts" is
not very useful. The prime concern is whether the evidence is relevant to
anything other than showing that the subject was a bad driver. Such cases
present considerations of relevance which must turn on the particular facts
of the case.
These applications of the rule mirror the considerations found in the
criminal cases which grapple with the same problems. The few civil cases
on point should be supplemented with the criminal precedent whenever the
issues are closely aligned.86
IV. EVIDENCE OF HABIT AND ROUTINE PRACTICE
A. General Considerations
Subsection 904.06(1) provides that evidence of a person's habit or an
organization's routine practice is relevant to prove that the person or organ-
ization acted in conformity with the habit or practice. The rule does not
provide for per se admissibility. Even though relevant, the evidence may be
excluded because of other considerations, such as those found in Section
904.03.
of the Wisconsin statutes, and stated that it proved the pugilistic pupil's malicious intent; no
further analysis was offered).
83. 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 40, % 406[01], at 406-11 (discussed in the
context of habit evidence).
84. These cases are collected and discussed in State v. Hart, 75 Wis. 2d 371, 384, 249
N.W.2d 810, 816 (1977).
85. It is less than clear that we have any discernable character trait for driving (e.g., "good"
versus "bad" drivers) which is distinguishable from the more general trait for carefulness.
86. See, e.g., Christianson v. Lease Assoc., Inc., 87 Wis. 2d 123, 128-29, 273 N.W.2d 776,
779 (1978) (in a suit for treble damages resulting from falsification of an automobile odometer
statement where defendant claimed "mistake," the trial court properly exercised its discretion in
admitting evidence of another "discrepancy" in a different odometer statement issued by defend-
ant on the same date).
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Problems surface immediately because the rule offers no definitions of
either "habit" or "routine practice." Consequently, it becomes difficult to
distinguish evidence of habit and routine practice, which is admissible, from
the use of character to show conduct in conformity, which is proscribed in
civil cases. Thus, it is imperative to distinguish habit from character, but
the distinction is not always easy to draw. One of the most frequently
quoted attempts to do so was made by McCormick:
People sometimes speak of a habit for care, a habit for prompt-
ness, or a habit of forgetfulness. They may say that an individual
has a bad habit of stealing or lying. Evidence of these "habits"
would be identical to the kind of evidence that is the target of the
general rule against character evidence. Character is a generalized
description of a person's disposition, or of the disposition in respect
to a general trait, such as honesty, temperance or peacefulness.
Habit, in the present context, is more specific. It denotes one's regu-
lar response to a repeated situation. If we speak of a character for
care, we think of the person's tendency to act prudently in all the
varying situations of life - in business, at home, in handling
automobiles and in walking across the street. A habit, on the other
hand, is the person's regular practice of responding to a particular
kind of situation with a specific type of conduct. Thus, a person may
be in the habit of bounding down a certain stairway two or three
steps at a time, of patronizing a particular pub after each day's work,
or of driving his automobile without using a seatbelt. The doing of
the habitual act may become semi-automatic, as with a driver who
invariably signals before changing lanes.8 7
Wisconsin courts have apparently adopted this distinction and recog-
nized on at least one occasion that the real problem is that what is often
inadmissible character evidence is slipped before the jury bearing the label
of "habit.""8
87. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 195, at 574-75.
88. Hart v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 371, 249 N.W.2d 810 (1977). In a prosecution for homicide by
negligent use of a motor vehicle, the trial court admitted evidence of defendant's driving pattern
shortly before the collision:
There was some discussion in the trial court as to whether the pre-accident testimony was
proper to show habit under § 904.06, Wis. Rules of Evidence, though neither the circuit
court nor the state in its brief rely upon such a theory. Habit, in this sense, is a "regular
response to a repeated specific situation." MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE, § 195 (2d ed. 1972).
We doubt the existence of a "habit" of due care or lack thereof. We believe we are dealing
with character evidence, though the courts are not always careful to preserve the distinc-
tion between the two terms, and they can and do appear to overlap at times.
Id. at 392-93 n.9, 249 N.W.2d at 819 n.9.
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The cases and commentary discussing habit and routine practice use the
terms in two different, sometimes conflicting ways. First, the narrow psy-
chological denotation describes a classic conditioned response: a semi-auto-
matic reaction repeated almost unvaryingly in the face of certain specific
circumstances. Second, a broader, probabilistic conception addresses the
frequency ard specificity of the occurrence of an act. That is, the more
often a person or organization has behaved in a certain way in a particular
context in the past, the more likely it is that the individual or organization
will behave the same way when confronted with the same circumstances on
another occasion.19
These two notions are of more than academic interest because they are
reflected in the case law and point up some of the difficulties in distinguish-
ing habit from character. As described below, it appears that in civil cases,
Section 904.06 is resorted to as a way of avoiding the conundrum that grips
character evidence in criminal cases.90 By plugging into Section 904.06, the
analysis sidesteps difficult questions about the nature of "character" and the
admissibility of other acts under subsection 904.04(2). Although the desire
to avoid this quagmire is understandable, the same rules apply in civil cases
and the confrontation is necessary even if distasteful.
In order to correct this problem, courts must first give discernable rigor
to the meanings of "habit" and "routine practice." It is suggested that
when the issue involves the conduct of a particular human being, the behav-
ior should be analyzed to determine whether it is a "habit;" here, the psy-
chological perspective should govern. The trial court should be satisfied
that the behavior in question actually implicates a semi-automatic, virtually
unconscious response to a specific set of circumstances. Examples are the
use of directionals when turning a car or putting on a wristwatch in the
morning. Conduct such as lecherous advances by a landlord toward female
tenants in a sexual harassment lawsuit, even on four or five different occa-
sions, points more towards a reprehensible character flaw than it does a
prurient Pavlovian response to female tenants.91 The narrow psychological
89. 23 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5273,
at 24 (1980).
90. Compare Hart, 75 Wis. 2d at 392 n.9, 249 N.W.2d at 819 n.9 (where the court "doubted"
the existence of a habit for due care but acknowledged that this behavior might constitute a char-
acter trait) with Chomicki v. Wittekind, 128 Wis. 2d 188, 196, 381 N.W.2d 561, 564 (Ct. App.
1985) (which implied that defendant, a landlord, had a "habit" or was engaged in the "routine
practice" of sexually harassing female tenants based on four similar incidents within a two year
period). For the inadmissibility of proof showing character for due care, see C. MCCORMICK,
supra note 7, § 5189, at 554.
91. Chomicki, 128 Wis. 2d at 188, 381 N.W.2d at 561. Plaintiff sued the defendant landlord
for sexual harassment. The court upheld the admission of this evidence as "routine practice,"
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perspective is the only principled way of assuring that the rule barring the
circumstantial use of character to prove conduct is not absorbed by the rule
allowing the use of habit.92
When assessing the conduct of an organization, the focus should be on
whether it is a "routine practice" and the probabilistic perspective should
govern.9" This approach is a more liberal standard favoring admissibility
than is the psychological approach, as it requires less in the way of specific-
ity of the conduct or frequency of its occurrence. The focus is on the cus-
toms, practices, and rules which are followed in the normal functioning of
the organization, such as the routing of various business decisions or the
handling of mail. At issue is not what a particular human being did on a
given occasion, but what the organization normally or regularly does with
respect to some recurring conduct. Administrative efficiency alone moti-
vates the regularity of a great deal of group behavior. Such routine prac-
tices are more susceptible to proof than are individual hiabits and it seems
less likely that jurors would overvalue such evidence.
B. Habit of Persons
Section 904.06 confirms the relevance of an inference from a person's
habit to the conclusion that he acted in conformity with it on a particular
occasion. At the outset the trial court must determine whether the prof-
fered behavior rises to the level of a habit and is not ill-disguised character
evidence. In making this assessment, the trial court should focus on the
specificity and frequency of the behavior.
For instance, a bad driving record may qualify the driver as a "habitual
traffic offender" under the traffic laws, but this appellation alone carries no
evidentiary significance. Driving is a volitional, fully conscious form of
apparently because this occurred within the context of defendant's business activities. This seems
wide of the mark. The evidence may, however, have been admissible under subsection 904.04(2)
on the issue of defendant's intent toward plaintiff.
92. It should also be observed that even if a party is allowed to use character circumstantially
to prove conduct, Section 904.05 limits the proponent to reputation and opinion testimony. Spe-
cific instances cannot be used to establish the character trait. On the other hand, Section 904.06
allows the proponent to establish a habit through specific instances as well as through opinion
testimony. Thus, the illegitimate use of habit to prove what is really character (if anything at all)
also circumvents rules governing the form of the proof.
93. See infra notes 94-110 and accompanying text (where it is suggested that the psychologi-
cal approach should control when considering whether a specific human being has a "habit" of
some sort). Although organizations and institutions comprise groups of human beings, the focus
is not on the behavior of a specific, identifiable individual within the organization, but on the
pattern of conduct manifest by the entity itself. On the question of whether a corporation or any
organization possesses a "character," see 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 40, § 5233, at
360.
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conduct embracing a variety of behaviors, such as speed, control, and driv-
ing patterns. It is not in and of itself a semi-conscious, nearly reflexive re-
sponse repeated in the presence of a specific set of circumstances. A
"terrible" driving record is relevant to the driver's actions on a particular
occasion only through an inference from a character trait for due care or
competence as a driver.94 This is distinguishable from specific driving re-
lated behavior such as the use of safety belts, which may properly constitute
a habit. In short, it is imperative that the trial court consider whether the
proffered behavioral trait constitutes a habit. This determination should be
kept separate from the different question of whether the behavioral trait
itself can be proven to exist.
The importance of these distinctions is seen in a case involving a declar-
atory judgment action over the ownership of certain money found in a
car." One claimant asserted that the money belonged to her deceased hus-
band, who she claimed had years earlier hidden the money (over $2,000 in
cash) in the car. Accordingly, she offered the testimony of her son, who
said that he saw his father "hide money in the car." The trial court ex-
cluded the testimony.96
The supreme court held that this testimony should have been admitted
as evidence of habit. It rejected the contention that the testimony failed to
show a sufficient number of instances warranting the finding of habit, stat-
ing that this went to the sufficiency of the evidence, not admissibility.97
This holding is perplexing for several reasons. It is not clear how "hid-
ing the money in a car" can constitute a habit, especially in the absence of
any proof as to the frequency of the behavior. Unlike wearing a wristwatch
or using directionals while driving, it is not apparent that people reflexively
stash money under the seats or in the glove compartment nearly every time
they get into the car.98 In short, hiding money in the car is not at all like
94. Hart, 75 Wis. 2d at 392 n.9, 249 N.W.2d at 819 n.9.
95. French v. Sorano, 74 Wis. 2d 460, 247 N.W.2d 182 (1976).
96. It is unclear from the facts given in the opinion whether the testimony referred to one
occasion or more than one. The court held that no offer of proof was necessary to preserve this
error because it was "obvious" that the witness "was going to testify that he had observed his
father hide money in the car." Id. at 466-67, 247 N.W.2d at 186.
97. However, the court found that the error was not prejudicial. It should also be noted that
the case was tried before a judge sitting as trier of fact. Although in theory this makes no differ-
ence, in practice, rules of evidence are customarily relaxed in bench trials, particularly as to rele-
vance. See M. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 103.6, at 23 (2d ed. 1986). In a
jury trial, Section 904.03 may have warranted exclusion because of the danger that the jury might
over-value the evidence.
98. Just because someone does something strange, and does it more than once, does not mean
it is a "habit." Ultimately in determining whether certain behavior constitutes a habit, the trial
judge must rely on his or her experiences, common-sense and views on human nature.
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adjusting the rearview mirror or turning on the car radio before starting the
car.9 9 Given the claim that the deceased had such a bizarre habit, the pro-
ponent of the habit should have been required to establish the frequency of
the conduct.°0 Absent such testimony, the trial court was justified in refus-
ing to find that an individual had any such habit. Even if the behavioral
trait does qualify as a habit, it may still be excluded if it is irrelevant or if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by other considerations. 1
C. Routine Practices Versus "Other Acts" Analysis
A number of civil cases have discussed the admissibility of an organiza-
tion's routine practice in order to prove that the entity behaved in accord-
ance with that practice. These cases reveal how important it is for lawyers
to think through exactly what it is they are trying to prove with the evi-
dence in question." 2 Just because a certain fact pattern recurs does not
mean that it constitutes a habit or routine practice. The evidence may very
well be admissible, but it is admissible under the rules governing the intro-
duction of other act evidence, not those rules relating to routine practice
evidence.
Evidence of routine practice or custom to show conduct in conformity is
proper only where the behavior is such that it naturally recurs within the
organization. A routine practice involves a finding that there is sufficient
evidence to conclude that whenever the organization is confronted with A,
it does, or very likely does, B. Conduct such as the routing of mail is one
99. See, eg., State v. Dwyer, 143 Wis. 2d 448, 422 N.W.2d 121 (Ct. App. 1988), aff'd, 149
Wis. 2d 850, 440 N.W.2d 344 (1989) (where defendant challenged the admissibility of his confes-
sion to police, held that the trial court acted within its discretion when it refused to admit testi-
mony by defense witness that six months earlier the same officer who interrogated defendant had
also threatened to send him to jail unless he confessed; the evidence failed to show the existence of
either a habit or routine practice by the officer).
100. The distinction which must be drawn is whether this is a true habit, as understood in
Section 904.06, or only quirky behavior, sporadically engaged in by the deceased. Just because a
witness chooses to characterize some behavior as a "habit" does not mean the court is duty bound
to admit it under Section 904.06. It is the court which must be satisfied that the behavior consti-
tutes a habit, not the witness. See Wis. STAT. § 901.04(1).
101. French, 74 Wis. 2d at 465, 247 N.W.2d at 185 ("appellant's testimony that her husband
had the practice of carrying large amounts of money, that her husband always locked his car, and
that her husband's father also had the habit of hiding money was irrelevant and thus,
inadmissible").
102. For example, Section 904.06 is not implicated where the custom is used simply to set the
standard of care. Since the evidence is not being used to show conduct in conformity, its admissi-
bility is governed by general principles of relevance. See 2 J. WEINSMIN & M.BERGER, supra
note 40, 406[02], at 406-14 to -15. To state it differently, evidence of custom to establish the
standard of care is used to show what should have been done, not what was done.
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obvious example.10 3 Another example concerns the practice of informing
prospective employees about various company policies at the time they are
hired."° Moreover, this kind of evidence may be used to prove the absence
of something. For instance, a nurse may testify that when taking a history
from a patient she asks about any present pain or other symptoms and then
records the complaints in her chart. This testimony may then be relevant to
prove the absence of such symptoms, or the patient's failure to mention
them, where the chart is silent as to any specific complaints by the
patient. 105
The point is that the routine practice should be a regular and recurring
activity. It may be proven through opinion testimony or by specific in-
stances. Although no magic number of proven instances is necessary to
establish a practice as "routine," the trial court is not obligated to accept
the witness' conclusion that a given course of conduct is routine.10 6 It must
be remembered that the probative value of this evidence is derived in large
measure from the fact that the business or other organization requires regu-
larity in the conduct of its business and that deviations are subject to inter-
nal scrutiny or sanction; therefore, one can infer that the entity will
generally follow its regular procedures.'0 7 Any deviation generally goes to
the weight of the evidence and is a proper issue for resolution by the trier of
fact.
The concept of "routine practice" has, in some instances, been stretched
to the point of breaking. In particular, one should not lose sight of the
importance of the "regularity" component. Just because something occurs
more than once does not mean it is therefore "routine" or "customary."
The temptation to draw this erroneous inference is especially tempting in
cases involving prior, similar accidents.
103. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 195, at 577. In general, the best example of an appro-
priate approach toward "routineness" is provided by the hearsay exception for records of regu-
larly conducted activities. Wis. STAT. § 908.03(6).
104. See, e.g., Micke v. Jack Walters & Sons Corp., 70 Wis. 2d 388, 234 N.W.2d 347 (1975)
(breach of oral employment agreement where the issue was whether plaintiff, a former salesman,
was entitled to commissions on projects that had not been paid for at the time of his termination;
defendant claimed that this was not the policy and offered testimony that all salesmen were in-
formed of this when hired; the court held that plaintiff was properly permitted to call one witness
to testify that this was not the policy and another who apparently testified that when he, the
witness, was hired by defendant as a salesman, he was not informed of the alleged policy regarding
commissions).
105. This example involves a situation which may show the nurse's habit or the institution's
regular practice in connection with charting.
106. See Wis. STAT. § 901.04(1).
107. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 195, at 577.
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For instance, in one case, plaintiff brought suit against a telephone com-
pany for injuries received from an improperly grounded phone.1"8 The in-
juries occurred when plaintiff, while holding the improperly grounded
phone, received an electrical shock caused by lightning transmitted through
the receiver. The court upheld the admission of ten other such incidents as
proof of negligence and causation. It specifically held that the evidence was
admissible under Section 904.06.109
Although ten similar accidents is a shockingly high number of accidents
and certainly relevant to negligence and the question of cause, it is difficult
to see how they constituted a "routine practice." Corporations may rou-
tinely route their mail, but one hopes that they do not routinely electrocute
or otherwise maim their customers. It should be recognized that the ten
prior accidents were probative of the probability of a defect in the phone
system that plaintiff's injury was caused by this defect, and that defendant
was aware, or should have been aware, of the defect entirely apart from
whether its negligence was "routine." In short, the admissibility of this
evidence should have been channeled through subsection 904.04(2) and Sec-
tion 904.03, not routine practice under Section 904.06. Such an analysis
allows the trial court to focus not on whether the conduct is routine, which
is a side-issue at best, but on the propositions for which the evidence is
properly admissible: the probability of a defect, the causal relation between
the defect and the injury, and whether defendant was aware of the defect.110
In summary, the label "routine practice" should not be applied as a substi-
tute for thinking about hard evidentiary problems.
CONCLUSION
Character-related evidence continues to bedevil the law of evidence de-
spite the advent of the Wisconsin Rules of Evidence. Much of this difficulty
is endemic to the subject and persists because the rules adopted most of the
confusion found in the common law.
108. Lobermeier v. General Tele. Co. of Wisconsin, 119 Wis. 2d 129, 150, 349 N.W.2d 466,
476 (1984).
109. The court cited only subsection 904.06(2), which controls the modes of proving habit or
routine practice. In reaching this conclusion, the court must have implicitly reasoned that the ten
incidents constituted "routine" conduct by the defendant. Id. at 151, 349 N.W.2d at 477.
110. It is interesting to note that the court's discussion in Lobermeier does include a quota-
tion from Netzel v. State Sand & Gravel Co., 51 Wis. 2d 1, 186 N.W.2d 258 (1971) and other
cases involving the admissibility of similar accidents. See Loberneier, 119 Wis. 2d at 150, 349
N.W.2d at 476. The reference to Section 904.06 appears to be almost an afterthought, which is
explicable by virtue of the large number of prior incidents involved in this case. Again, the evi-
dence is quite probative of negligence and cause apart from whether it constitutes "routine"
behavior.
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Most of the problems that plague the use of character-related evidence
in criminal trials also arise in civil litigation. Understandably, there has
been a tendency in the civil cases and commentary to avoid the difficulties
that have arisen in the criminal context. This has taken the form of carving
out what purport to be special doctrines involving the admission of "similar
accidents" or evidence of "habit" or "routine practice." When one looks
beneath the surface, however, one finds the same ambiguities and confusion
in the civil cases as are found in the criminal.
The answer then is not to rename the problems, but to address them in a
coherent fashion. Although this article does not attempt a solution, it is
hoped that some insight is gained through the observation that character-
related evidence presents many of the same proof problems in criminal and
civil cases. By isolating these common proof problems the courts and com-
mentators may be better able to offer advice about possible solutions.
